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3. The court might render judgment for the holder for the whole
amount of the check with leave to the drawer to satisfy it -by assign-
ing to the holder a portion of his deposit claim against the drawee
bank equal to the amount of the check which has been dishonored.
By this plan the case would be finally disposed of at once, and the
amount of the plaintiff's recovery would be determined with mathe-
matical accuracy. The loss which the plaintiff stood to suffer would
be the exact amount intended by the Negotiable Instruments Law.
And as the rule would have all the merits of speed and simplicity, it
would seem a desirable substitute for jury guesses. The innovation
might be put in force by a statute.23
HENRY T. POWELL.
Carriers-Allowance of Set-Off Against Freight Charges
A shipper, sued for freight charges, attempted to set off damages
arising from negligence and delay in shipment. A federal District
Court held that he was not entitled to plead set-off.1
Defendant shipped grapes over plaintiff's line. Plaintiff delivered
without collecting freight and brought suit for the charges. Defend-
ant set up loss due to delay and negligent handling and asked for a
set-off which was allowed by the United States Supreme Court.2
The problem might be solved by an amendment adding the following to
§186 of the N. I. L.: "Provided, however, that when such check is found not
to have been presented within a reasonable time, and the drawer had the right
at the time of presentment, as between himself and the drawee, to have the
check paid, the drawer shall be entitled to be fully discharged from liability
thereon -by assigning to the holder thereof the portion of his claim against
the drawee equal to the amount of the check."
This is somewhat similar to §74 of the English Bills of Exchange Act,
which after stating, in effect, §186 of the N. I. L., adds: "The holder of such
check as to which such drawer or person is discharged, shall be a creditor, in
lieu of such drawer or person, of such banker, to the extent of such discharge,
and entitled to recover the amount from him."
This result may possibly be reached without an enabling statute by judicial
decree at the time of trial. See Hawes v. Blackwell, 107 N. C. 196, 12 S. E. 245
(1890). However, constitutional objections might well be raised against such
procedure.
There might be some ground for extending the language of the amend-
ment above proposed to include also domiciled demand notes. See Note (1930)
8 N. C. L. REv. 184.
'Michigan Cent. R. Co. v. Carl & W. J. Piowaty, Inc., 36 F. (2d) 604 (N. D.
Ill. 1929).
1 Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Lindell, 50 Sup. Ct. 200 (1930).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
These two cases, though representing opposing views, were de-
cided only two months apart, the second being the first holding of the
Supreme Court upon the question. Both the district courts and the
various state courts have been nearly evenly divided in opinion.3 The
only decision 4 in a Circuit Court of Appeals forms the basis for the
adverse holding of the first case here considered. It is there main-
tained that to allow a set-off would controvert the intention of Con-
gress as expressed in the Interstate Commerce Acts to enforce uni-
form collection and prevent discrimination. Congress has attempted
to destroy the practice of discriminating by means of rebates and
allowances of claims for damages. 5 One device used in granting such
rebates was for the shipper to file fictitious claims for damages. 6
Under the act of Congress a carrier cannot accept in payment for the
transportation of interstate commerce anything but cash. If the ship-
per be allowed to set off claims for damages, the court must under-
take the impossible task of holding the carrier to diligence and good
faith in preparing and presenting its defense, in order to prevent the
granting and receiving of rebates by insidious agreement between the
parties. 7 So important is it that the collection of freight charges be
uniform and above suspicion of favoritism that it seems against public
policy to permit a counterclaim of this kind to be pleaded.8
The Supreme Court could not see that this manner of pleading
was any more subject to collusion than any other and upheld the
practicability of faster settlement of claims by the use of set-off and
counterclaim.
The act9 prohibiting carriers from refunding any part of charges
does not prevent shipper from setting up counterclaim.10 There is
nothing in the letter or the spirit of this chapter which prevents the
'Pennsylvania P_ Co. v. South Carolina Produce Ass'n., 25 F. (2d) 315 (E.
D. S. C. 1928).
"Fullerton Lumber Co. v. Chicago, M., S. P. & P. R. Co., 36 F. (2d) 180
(C. C. A. 8th, 1929).
'Pennsylvania R. Co. v. South Carolina Produce Ass'n., supra note 3.
'Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. W. L. Hoopes & Sons, 233 Fed. 135 (S. D. Iowa,
1916).
' Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. v. William S. Stein Co., 233 Fed. 716 (D. Neb.
1915) ; Johnson-Browl" Co. v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co. 239 Fed. 590 (S. D.
Ga. 1917).
8 Supra note 6.
028 U. S. C. A. §724 (Conformity of federal procedure to that of state in
which district court is held) ; 49 U. S. C. A. §6 (7) forbidding carrier to re-
fund in any manner any portion of charges does not prevent shipper setting up
loss recoverable under par. 20 (11) as counterclaim.
'0 Supra note 2.
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shipper from setting off damages of shipment against freight
charges." If in an action by the carriers for charges, a shipper can-
not counterclaim for a cause of action ordinarily pleadable as such,
then as a corollary, in an action by the shipper the carrier should not
be permitted to counterclaim. There is no ground for differentiating
or for treating suits by one wherein the other counterclaims as pre-
sumptively collusive.' 2 It must be assumed that, when litigants come
into a court, they are submitting a real controversy for settlement.'2
Adjustments of demands by counterclaims rather than by independent
suit serves to avoid circuity of action and is encouraged by law. 14
Commendable economy and efficiency in judicial procedure would,
seem to justify the disposition of the entire related controversy in one
action.' 5
G. A. LONG.
Conflict of Laws-Death by Wrongful Act-Limitations on
Right of Action
Under the Florida laws, an action for damages for wrongful
death may be brought at any time within two years after the death
occurred.' The North Carolina wrongful death statute2 specifies that
the action must be brought within one year. More than one year, but
less than two years, after a cause of action accrued in Florida, suit
was instituted in North Carolina. Held, action barred.8
When common law actions are involved, the general rule is that
the law of the place governs the right, and the law of the forum
governs the remedy.4 Since general statutes of limitation are pro-
cedural in nature, it follows that the limitation of common law ac-
tions is governed by the lex fori.5 Thus, if action is barred by the
statute of limitations of the forum, no action can be maintained
'Battle v. Atkinson, 9 Ga. App. 488, 71 S. E. 775 (1911) ; Pennsylvania R
Co. v. Bellinger, 101 Misc. Rep. 105, 166 N. Y. S. 652 (1917).
'Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. v. E. C. Tecktonius Mfg. Co. 262 Fed. 715 (E.
D. Wis. 1920).
' Wells Fargo & Co. v. Cuneo, 241 Fed. 727 (S. D. N. Y. 1917).
" North Chicago Rolling Mill Co. v. St. Louis Ore & Steel Co., 152 U. S.
596, 615-616, 14 Sup. -Ct. 710, 715-716, 38 L. ed. 565 (1894).
"Payne, Director General v. Clark, 271 Fed. 525 (S. D. Cal. 1921).
'FLA. REV. GEN. STAT. (1920), §§4960-61, 2930 (6).
'N. C. CoNs. STAT. ANN. (1919), §160.
1Tieffenbrun v. Flannery, 198 N. C. 397, 151 S. E. 857 (1930).
" Scudder v. Union Nat. Bank, 91 U. S. 406, 23 L. ed. 245 (1875) ; 1 Woon,
LImITATioNs (4th ed. 1916) 62.
'McElmoyle v. Cohen, 13 Pet. 312, 10 L. ed. 177 (1839) ; Patton v. Lumber
Co., 171 N. C. 837, 73 S. E. 167 (1916) ; Note (1900) 48 L. R. A. 625.
